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THE ERIE DOCTRINE & McDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK: 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING OR AN ISSUE WORTH 
ANALYZING? 
INTRODUCTION 
Vertical choice of law issues have long been controlled by the doctrine 
first presented by the United States Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins.1  The Erie doctrine dictates that federal law in conflict with a state 
law is categorized as “substantive” or “procedural” in order to determine 
whether the law should be applied to cases in federal courts based on diversity 
jurisdiction.2  “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply 
state substantive law and federal procedural law.”3  At a high level of 
generality, a law is procedural if it provides the “‘manner and mode’ of filing 
and prosecuting lawsuits.”4  On the contrary, substantive laws govern liability 
and dictate the outcome of a case.5 
Identifying a law as “substantive” or “procedural” is not as simple as it 
may appear.  This process has been described by the Supreme Court as a 
“challenging endeavor,”6 especially when the federal rule in conflict is the 
product of judicial interpretation of federal statutes, because these rules can 
have both procedural and substantive features.7  The burden-shifting 
framework presented in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green8 is a famous 
 
 1. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 2. Id. (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a 
[S]tate . . . [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
courts.”). 
 3. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 4. See Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & 
Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 481–82 (2005) (providing a summary 
definition of “procedural” and “substantive” in the Erie doctrine context). 
 5. Id. at 482 (providing broad examples of laws that are substantive rather than procedural). 
 6. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427. 
 7. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that determining whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is procedural or substantive is an 
instance of how making such a classification is a challenging endeavor). 
 8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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example of judicial interpretation of federal statutes that makes an Erie 
doctrine analysis a particularly challenging endeavor.9 
The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to employment discrimination 
cases and is applied when the plaintiff has indirect evidence, but no direct 
evidence, of discriminatory motives.10  In addition to its application to 
discrimination cases, an adaptation of the original McDonnell Douglas 
framework can be applied to retaliatory discharge claims.11  A retaliation claim 
arises when an employee believes that he or she has been wrongly retaliated 
against by his or her employer.12  Although many federal statutes provide the 
basis for retaliation claims,13 starting in the 1970s, many states also 
acknowledged state law claims for retaliation.14 
Under a federal retaliatory discharge claim, the plaintiff can prove 
retaliation by using the adapted McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework.15  However, not all states implement a form of the McDonnell 
 
 9. See Snead, 237 F.3d at 1090–93 (explaining how an Erie doctrine analysis of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is “a challenging endeavor”). 
 10. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (describing the 
McDonnell Douglas framework and how it is applied to discrimination claims). 
 11. See infra footnotes 108–25 and accompanying text (discussing the adaptation of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework that is applied to retaliation claims). 
 12. See Rhea Gertken, Note, Causation in Retaliation Claims: Conflict Between the Prima 
Facie Case and the Plaintiff’s Ultimate Burden of Pretext, 81 WASH U. L.Q. 151, 152 (2003) 
(summarizing the situation in which a retaliation claim may arise). 
 13. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (stating that it would be unlawful for any 
employer “to discharge or . . . discriminate against any employee because such employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this 
chapter”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because 
he has opposed any practice . . . or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000) (“No person shall discriminate 
against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by 
this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1979); Frampton v. Cent. 
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976); but see Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 372 (Wis. 
2002) (the Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressly refusing to recognize a state law claim for 
retaliation). 
 15. See, e.g., Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to a FLSA retaliation claim); Grant v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the order of proof in a 
retaliation case uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis).  Although a true 
McDonnell Douglas framework is intended to allow the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 
without direct evidence of causation, in the retaliation context every circuit except the Seventh 
Circuit has adopted an untrue McDonnell Douglas framework which requires the plaintiff to use 
direct evidence to establish a “causal link” between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the 
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Douglas framework for state law retaliatory discharge claims.16  This 
disagreement between federal circuits and state courts creates a potential 
conflict of law.  In resolving the issue, if an Erie doctrine analysis were to 
deem the McDonnell Douglas framework to be procedural, it would apply to 
state law claims in federal court.17  But if the framework is found to be 
substantive, the state framework would apply.18 
Whether McDonnell Douglas is procedural or substantive is currently an 
unresolved issue that has been identified by courts and academic authors.19  
However, as this Comment will recognize, although the issue of potential 
conflicts has been raised and emphasized by judges and authors over the past 
decade, the number of actual conflicts within the United States is drastically 
limited, almost to the point of extinction.20  For whatever reason, courts and 
academic authors have failed to recognize the limited scope of the issue.21  Not 
only have courts and authors not recognized the limited scope of actual 
conflicts, they have actually commented on the “surprising” lack of academic 
 
employer’s retaliation.  See infra notes 108–23 and accompanying text (providing the untrue 
McDonnell Douglas frameworks applied by each circuit).  The Seventh Circuit has dissented 
from following the other circuits, creating a framework that allows plaintiffs to establish 
retaliation claims using indirect evidence, in the spirit of a true McDonnell Douglas framework.  
See, e.g., Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 16. See, e.g, Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 407–08 (Ill. 1998) (the 
Supreme Court of Illinois expressly rejecting the application of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to Illinois state law retaliatory discharge claims); Jordan v. Clay’s Rest Home, Inc., 
483 S.E.2d 203, 207 (Va. 1997) (the Supreme Court of Virginia declining to adopt the McDonnell 
Douglas framework in order to retain the state’s strong commitment to the employment-at-will 
doctrine). 
 17. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090–93 (ruling that federal 
courts could apply the McDonnell Douglas framework because it is procedural). 
 18. See Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (recognizing that if McDonnell Douglas is substantive, the federal court should apply 
the state standard). 
 19. Carter v. Tennant Co., 383 F.3d 673, 677, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the issue 
is unresolved in the Seventh Circuit); Bourbon, 223 F.3d at 473–74 (Posner, J., concurring) 
(noting that the issue is unresolved in the Seventh Circuit); Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating 
Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 349, 351–53 (2007) (identifying that the issue has remained unresolved); Melissa 
Kotun, Note, Applying the Erie Doctrine and the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Analysis 
When a Conflict with State Law Arises Through a Retaliatory Discharge Claim, 35 GA. L. REV. 
1251, 1252–53 (2001) (explaining that the Seventh Circuit has elected to leave the issue 
unresolved). 
 20. See infra notes 150–89 (identifying Illinois and the Seventh Circuit as the only conflict 
of law in the United States). 
 21. See, e.g., Carter, 383 F.3d at 677; Bourbon, 223 F.3d F.3d at 473–74 (Posner, J., 
concurring); Sperino, supra note 19, at 352; Kotun, supra note 19, at 1252. 
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literature on the issue.22  Consequently, this Comment sets out to determine 
whether the court opinions and academic literature calling for a resolution are 
merely “much ado about nothing,” such that courts and academic authors 
should ignore the issue, or whether the actual conflicts of law concerning 
retaliation frameworks are significant enough to conduct an Erie analysis. 
Section I of this Comment will discuss the history and development of the 
Erie doctrine and McDonnell Douglas framework, including the application of 
McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims.  Section II will consider the states in 
which potential conflict of law issues arise and argue that although the issue is 
“much ado about nothing” in forty-nine states, the issue is significant enough 
to apply the Erie doctrine to the conflict of law in Illinois.  Section III will 
analyze Illinois’s conflict of law and argue that the Seventh Circuit’s 
adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas framework is procedural and should be 
applied to state law claims in federal court. 
I.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Erie Doctrine–Vertical Choice of Law 
Federalism entitles state and federal governments to their own judicial 
systems.23  The Rules of Decision Act24 was enacted to define the working 
relationship between each court system.25  The working relationship between 
state and federal courts is important because a lack of cooperation between the 
court systems can result in different substantive results for parties with 
identical claims, depending on which court system is used.26 
Legal rights and results should remain constant among jurisdictions in 
order to promote fairness and consistency to litigants.27  As a result, certain 
rules are important to ensure that state and federal courts within the same 
 
 22. See Bourbon, 223 F.3d at 474 (Posner, J., concurring) (identifying a lack of “any 
illuminating scholarly discussions of the issue”); Sperino, supra note 19, at 352–53 (noting that 
the lack of academic commentary on the issue is surprising considering the “federalism problems 
that improper vertical choice of law” will cause). 
 23. Condlin, supra note 4, at 481. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
 25. Condlin, supra note 4, at 477 n.8. 
 26. Id. at 481. 
 27. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 712 (1974) 
(stating that it is unfair to subject a person to different standards of law based upon where the 
litigation takes place); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489 (1954) (arguing that citizens must be able to discern one authoritative 
legal voice in order to mold their behaviors accordingly). 
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geographical area follow the same or similar substantive rules.28  The Erie 
doctrine is an example of common law guidelines implemented to create 
consistency between federal and state courts within the same jurisdiction. 
1. Pre-Erie Development 
In 1789, Congress passed the aforementioned Rules of Decision Act, 
which was designed to ensure that federal and state courts apply the same 
substantive legal rules by stating that “[t]he laws of the several states, except 
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”29  
However, courts were unable to consistently interpret the “laws of the several 
states” language of the Rules of Decision Act.30 
The indecision of the application of the Rules of Decision Act led to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Swift v. Tyson.31  In Swift, the Court found that the 
“laws of the several states” language of the Rules of Decision Act was only 
intended to refer to state statutes; consequently, decisions of state courts were 
not binding on the federal courts and were only considered to be “evidence of 
what the laws are; and not of themselves laws.”32  The majority believed that 
“the federal judiciary should develop a comprehensive body of substantive 
federal common law to serve as a model for state courts to encourage 
uniformity in the state courts.”33 
Almost eighty years after Swift, the Supreme Court used its rationale from 
Swift to decide the Black and White Taxicab case,34 where it found the Rules of 
Decision Act did not dictate the application of Kentucky common law to 
resolve an issue concerning the validity of an exclusive rights contract.35  
Instead, the court found that the federal court could resolve the issue by using 
the federal common law.36 
 
 28. Ely, supra note 27, at 712 (stating that fairness to persons involved in litigation is one of 
the major policy considerations for advocating similar substantive laws between state and federal 
courts). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (also known as the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 30. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid 
the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1240–41 (1999) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
thought it was necessary to make the Swift v. Tyson decision because of the interpretation 
problems concerning the Rules of Decision Act). 
 31. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. Id. at 19; Kotun, supra note 19, at 1257 (citation omitted). 
 34. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 35. Id. at 529. 
 36. Id. at 530–31. 
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The Supreme Court’s rationale in Swift was criticized from the beginning 
because of the broad and indecisive nature of federal general common law.37  
Federal common law virtually guaranteed conflicts in interpretation between 
state and federal courts because it essentially authorized the federal courts to 
determine the content of common law without consideration for how the 
highest court of the state would rule on the issue.38  By excluding state court 
decisions under the Rules of Decision Act, federal courts were interfering in 
issues clearly within the scope of state law.39  The conflict between federal and 
state courts was the power behind the vertical choice of law reform provided 
by the Supreme Court in the Erie doctrine. 
2. The Erie Decision 
The Erie decision is considered one of the most significant cases in 
American legal history.40  In response to the criticism of a generalized federal 
common law, the Supreme Court in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins41 reversed Swift, 
by declaring “[t]here is no federal general common law.”42  The Court listed 
three reasons for overruling Swift.  First, the Court found Swift’s interpretation 
of the Rules of Decision Act was flawed based on the Act’s legislative 
history.43 
Second, the Court stated that “[e]xperience in applying the doctrine of 
Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, political and social,” and that Swift’s 
expected benefits did not occur.44  Despite Swift’s goal to develop uniformity, 
state courts had persisted in making their own conclusions about the content of 
federal common law, and consequently, it was impossible to discover a means 
of aligning federal common law and state law.45  In addition, the Court noted 
that federal common law ultimately expanded such that state common law was 
 
 37. See Bauer, supra note 30, at 1242 n.25 (documenting the criticism that Swift was 
subjected to due to the absence of distinctions between local law and general common law). 
 38. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (noting that “[t]he fallacy underlying 
the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is . . . [t]he doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is a 
transcendental body of law outside  of any particular State . . . that federal courts have the power 
use their judgment as to what the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts the 
parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 39. Kotun, supra note 19, at 1258. 
 40. Justice Stone called the Erie decision “the most important opinion since I have been on 
the court.”  Irving Younger, Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1029 
(1978). 
 41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 42. Id. at 78. 
 43. Id. at 72; Kotun, supra note 19, at 1258. 
 44. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
 45. Id. 
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left with little to regulate.46  Consequently, results for similar claims in state 
and federal courts were different, and “[t]he discrimination resulting became in 
practice far-reaching.”47 
Third, the Court asserted that Swift’s interpretation of the Rules of 
Decision Act was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not grant the 
authority for a federal general common law.48  Accordingly, neither Congress 
nor federal courts have the power to “declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or general, be they 
commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”49  By eliminating this generalized 
federal common law, the Court declared that “[t]he authority and only 
authority [of the law] is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the 
State as its own (whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) 
should utter the last word.”50  However, the concurring opinion by Justice 
Reed suggested that federal courts would still be permitted to apply their own 
procedural rules.51 
Most of the Erie decision concentrated on rejecting Swift’s interpretation 
of the Rules of Decision Act.  Thus, more refined instructions to determine 
when a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law were needed from 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.  As a result, the Erie doctrine has been 
subjected to several modifications since its inception in 1938. 
3. Post-Erie Modifications 
The Supreme Court’s first modification of Erie came seven years later in 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.52  In Guaranty Trust, the Court had to apply the 
Rules of Decision Act to determine whether the plaintiff should be subject to 
the state or federal statute of limitations when the case was in federal court 
based on diversity jurisdiction.53  The Court held that federal courts must rely 
on state law when resolving substantive rights in equity matters;54 however, the 
 
 46. Id. at 75. 
 47. Id.  The Supreme Court would later call these evils the “inequitable administration of the 
laws” and the “discouragement of forum-shopping.” Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 
(1965). 
 48. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72, 79. 
 49. Id. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. at 79. 
 51. Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) (stating that “no one doubts federal power over 
procedure”).  This helped to develop the substantive/procedural distinction, along with the 
majority’s statement that Congress cannot impose “substantive rules of common law applicable in 
a state.” Id. at 78. 
 52. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 53. Id. at 107. 
 54. Id. at 112 (“The source of substantive rights enforced by a federal court under diversity 
jurisdiction . . . is the law of the States.”). 
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Court noted that classifying a statute of limitations as substantive or procedural 
can be problematic because it can be viewed as both.55 
Therefore, the Court took a functional approach in refining the 
substance/procedure standard.56  The well-known refinement from Guaranty 
Trust was the outcome determinative test, which asks whether the law would 
“significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a 
law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by 
the same parties in a State court[.]”57  Accordingly, when rights under state law 
are enforced in federal court, the federal court becomes “another court of the 
State.”58  When the Court applied the outcome determinative test to a state 
statute of limitations, it found that “a federal court in a diversity case should 
follow State law,” because a state statute of limitations “would completely bar 
recovery in a suit if brought in a State court.”59 
However, the Court’s outcome determinative test proved to be problematic 
and subject to criticism because, when taken literally, the test was over-
inclusive since both procedural and substantive rules could potentially affect 
outcome.60  As a result, the Supreme Court again reevaluated the Erie doctrine 
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.61 
In Byrd, the state practice at issue allowed a judge, rather than a jury, to 
decide whether the plaintiff was an employee for the purposes of the state’s 
workmen’s compensation law.62  In determining whether the state or federal 
practice should apply, the Court acknowledged Guaranty Trust’s outcome 
determinative test, but modified the test to be evaluated in light of any strong 
“affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations.”63  In essence, to evaluate 
such countervailing federal considerations, the Court used a balancing test to 
weigh the relevant federal interest against developing litigation with the same 
result in state and federal court.64  In Byrd, the Court found that “there is a 
strong federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury 
 
 55. From one view, a limitations rule is substantive because it defines an element of a cause 
of action by providing the length of time the cause of action exists.  Id. at 108.  From another 
view, a limitations rule is procedural because it is merely a scheduling rule for administering a 
claim.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 109. 
 57. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108–09. 
 58. Id. (adding that a federal court “cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made 
unavailable by the State”). 
 59. Id. at 110. 
 60. See Bauer, supra note 30, at 1258 (noting the over-inclusiveness of the outcome 
determinative test). 
 61. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 62. Id. at 535. 
 63. Id. at 537. 
 64. See generally Condlin, supra note 4, at 503 (noting that the court seemed to use this 
balancing test without actually using the term “balance”). 
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relationship in the federal courts.”65  The Court balanced this interest against 
the interest that litigation should not come out differently in state and federal 
courts, and concluded that the federal policy for jury trials was stronger.66 
Since balancing tests can be vague and broadly applied, especially in the 
context of the Erie doctrine,67 the Supreme Court again undertook a 
reevaluation of the Erie doctrine in Hanna v. Plumer.68  Hanna has been called 
the most important of the Erie doctrine modifications because it reconciles the 
contradictions of the earlier cases while combining the prior cases’ 
formulations of the Erie doctrine into a single statement, which does not rely 
on balancing.69 
The issue in Hanna was whether the federal court should apply the federal 
or state rule for service of process.70  The Court declared that Guaranty Trust’s 
outcome determinative test must be interpreted with “reference to the twin 
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.”71  The forum-shopping requirement is 
intended for the court to consider whether litigants will specifically choose 
either federal or state courts based on the perceived results in each, when it is 
possible for a litigant to comply with both state and federal law.72  To avoid the 
inequitable administration of the laws, federal courts must apply state law 
when “it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to 
differ” because the litigation has been brought in federal court.73 
In considering the twin aims of Erie, the Court concluded that the federal 
rule for service of process was controlling in federal courts because the 
plaintiff, “in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation where 
application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather adherence to the 
state rule would have resulted only in altering the way in which process was 
served.”74  Following Hanna, a logical conclusion may be made that when a 
federal court sitting in diversity considers a conflicting state rule with a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure that was enacted under the Rules Enabling Act, the 
 
 65. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. 
 66. Id. at 538. 
 67. Balancing tests can be open-ended, especially when balancing federal and state interests. 
 68. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 69. See Condlin, supra note 4, at 507 (stating that Hanna is the most important modification 
to the Erie interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act because it “makes sense as a matter of 
policy and provides a workable, clear, and almost algorithmic statement of how to determine the 
applicability of state law in federal courts.”). 
 70. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. 
 71. Id. at 468. 
 72. Id. at 469. 
 73. Id. at 467. 
 74. Id. at 469. 
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court should apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, regardless if the 
federal rule is contrary to the state’s rule.75 
The Supreme Court’s most recent modification to the Erie doctrine came 
from Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.76  The issue before the Court in 
Gasperini was whether the state or federal standard of appellate review should 
be followed by federal trial courts sitting in diversity.77  Reverting back to the 
balancing of state and federal interests discussed in Byrd, the Court asserted 
that the “dispositive question . . . is whether federal courts can give effect to 
the substantive trust [of the state law] without untoward alteration of the 
federal scheme for the trial and decision of civil cases.”  In an opinion widely 
criticized for the Court’s reversion back to a balancing of interests analysis,78 
the Court found that the state’s enhanced appellate review must be followed by 
federal trial courts in diversity cases but not by federal appellate courts.79 
After Gasperini, then, an Erie analysis does not end with Hanna’s twin 
aims of Erie.80  The court must also consider whether the state procedural law 
is closely related to state substantive policy.81  However, even if the state 
procedural rule is outcome determinative or was enacted for substantive 
reasons, the court must balance whether the federal interests outweigh the state 
interests.82  If the federal interests outweigh the state interests, the court should 
apply the federal procedural rule or try to accommodate both interests, as 
Gasperini accomplished by applying the state standard to federal trial courts 
but not appellate courts.83 
B. McDonnell Douglas Framework 
1. The McDonnell Douglas Decision 
The McDonnell Douglas framework was developed by the Supreme Court 
in 1973 when it held that a former employee at a McDonnell Douglas plant 
could establish a race discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence.84  
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Supreme Court introduced the McDonnell 
Douglas framework in order to address the “proper order and nature of proof in 
 
 75. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470–74. 
 76. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 418–19. 
 78. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay 
on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 707–18 (2006) (describing 
the Gasperini opinion as a “misleading and uncertain guide to what federal practice actually is”). 
 79. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 419. 
 80. Id. at 428. 
 81. Id. at 429–31. 
 82. Id. at 431–32. 
 83. Id. at 437. 
 84. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). 
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actions under Title VII.”85  The Supreme Court laid out an elaborate, three-part 
burden shifting framework for use in disparate treatment discrimination cases 
in which direct evidence of the defendant’s discriminatory motive is 
unavailable.86  Under the framework, the plaintiff carries the “initial burden 
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.”87  
The plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing: 
(i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified 
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant’s qualifications.88 
If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its] 
rejection.”89  If the defendant is able to express a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason,” the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who is 
afforded “a fair opportunity to show that [the defendant’s] stated reason for 
[its] rejection was in fact pretext.”90 
2. Post-McDonnell Douglas Rationale and Modifications 
While the Supreme Court did not justify the McDonnell Douglas 
framework in its McDonnell Douglas opinion, it did so in Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine.91  The Court explained that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework’s prima facie case requirement “eliminates the most 
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”92  The 
plaintiff’s establishment of the prima facie case “creates a presumption that the 
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee,” and if the defendant 
 
 85. Id. at 793. 
 86. Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is Not 
Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 754 (2006) 
(explaining that the three-part framework was a change from prior tests with less regimented 
standards that required the plaintiff to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
employer was guilty of a discriminatory act”).  In 1985, the Court made the clarification that the 
framework was to apply to cases where a plaintiff has no direct evidence of the employer’s 
discriminatory motive.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
 87. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 88. Id. (footnote omitted).  The Court noted that the facts necessary for the plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case will vary based on the factual scenario.  Id. at 802 n.13. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 804. 
 91. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 92. Id. at 253–54. 
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fails to rebut the presumption, the court “must enter judgment for the plaintiff 
because no issue of fact remains.”93 
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must “clearly 
set forth” through admissible evidence “the reasons for the plaintiff’s 
rejection.” 94  The Court modified this stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework by stating that the defendant’s burden is of production, such that 
the defendant must express a “legally sufficient” reason to support judgment in 
its favor without necessarily needing to “persuade the court that it was actually 
motivated by the proffered reasons.”95 
If the defendant offers rebuttal evidence of a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason,” the plaintiff’s prima facie case loses “the legally 
mandatory inference of discrimination” by the defendant.96  Consequently, to 
be successful, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s articulated 
reason was pretextual.97  The plaintiff can establish pretext “directly by 
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proferred explanation is 
unworthy of credence.”98 
After Burdine, the circuits disagreed as to whether a plaintiff was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law if he or she could establish a prima facie case 
and convince the trier of fact to reject the defendant’s legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory justification for its decision.99  In St. Mary’s Honor Center 
v. Hicks, the Supreme Court addressed the circuit disagreement, holding that 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff is not required.100  Instead, the Court ruled 
 
 93. Id. at 254. 
 94. Id. at 254–55. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (explaining that the plaintiff’s prima facie “evidence and 
inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of 
whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual”). 
 97. Id. at 256 (noting that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion and that the 
plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was not the true reason for 
the employment decision merges with the “ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the 
plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional discrimination”). 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. Compare Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1993) (ruling 
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law after establishing the prima facie case 
and refuting the defendant’s stated reason), with Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 
1503, 1503 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient for judgment as 
a matter of law when the evidence only establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case and refutes the 
defendant’s stated reason); cf. Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 
1983) (deciding that a judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff is permissible but not 
mandatory when the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case and refutes the defendant’s stated 
reason). 
 100. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ 
holding that rejection of the defendant’s proferred reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff 
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that if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant’s burden is not 
discharged unless the defendant “introduce[s] evidence which, taken as true, 
would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse action.”101 
Therefore, following Hicks, the plaintiff may simultaneously establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant’s pretext.102  If the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and refutes the defendant’s stated, 
nondiscriminatory reason, the court may grant judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff as a matter of law.103  However, the plaintiff cannot win the case if its 
prima facie case is found to be inadequate in law or fails to convince the trier 
of fact.104 
3. Application of McDonnell Douglas to Retaliation Claims 
Employees in the workplace are protected from an employer’s 
discriminatory actions by such federal employment discrimination protection 
statutes as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII), the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).105  However, for this protection to be effective, employees must feel 
comfortable to come forward and report the discrimination and not fear 
repercussions from their employer for reporting the discrimination.  Employee 
decisions about whether to challenge discrimination are based on a balancing 
of the costs and benefits of reporting.106  Accordingly, many federal 
employment statutes, including Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the Fair 
 
disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of 
proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the 
‘ultimate burden of persuasion.’”). 
 101. Id. at 509 (emphasis in original). 
 102. Id. at 508. 
 103. Id at 519. 
 104. Id. at 510 n.3 (stating that the defendant’s failure to introduce evidence of a 
nondiscriminatory reason will cause the court to rule against it, unless the plaintiff fails to 
establish his or her prima facie case). 
 105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (“No covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”); 29 U.S.C. 623(a) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
age.”). 
 106. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 36–37 (2006) (providing the 
example that women who choose to confront discrimination make that decision because they 
believe that the costs of confrontation outweigh the benefits, while women who report 
discrimination tend to be optimistic about the benefits of reporting). 
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA), provide retaliation provisions protecting 
employees who report violations of the statutes.107 
Courts have consistently recognized that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework may be applied to cases of retaliation.108  The burden shifting 
aspect of the framework applies to retaliation claims as it does to other 
employment discrimination claims.  The plaintiff must first carry the burden of 
proving a prima facie case of retaliation to create an inference of the 
employer’s retaliatory motive.109  After the plaintiff has established a prima 
facie case, “the defendant can defeat it by producing evidence that the motive 
for firing or taking other adverse employment action against the plaintiff was 
not retaliatory, unless the plaintiff is able to come back and show that the 
alleged nonretaliatory motive was actually pretextual.”110 
However, although this burden-shifting framework follows McDonnell 
Douglas, the three requirements of the prima facie case are not necessarily in 
accordance with the principles of McDonnell Douglas.111  Most courts have 
recognized three elements to the plaintiff’s prima facie retaliation claim: “(1) 
opposition to discrimination or participation in covered proceedings; (2) 
adverse action; (3) causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse action.”112  Every circuit except for the Seventh Circuit has adopted a 
 
 107. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006) (stating that it would be unlawful for any 
employer “to discharge or . . . discriminate against any employee because such employee has 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this 
chapter”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to 
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any 
member . . . because such individual, member, or applicant for membership has opposed any 
practice made unlawful by this section, or . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.”); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has 
opposed any practice . . . or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000) (“No person shall discriminate against any 
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter 
or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Conner v. Schnuck Mkt., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying 
the McDonnell Douglas framework to an FLSA retaliation claim); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is well established that the order of proof in a 
retaliation case follows the rule in McDonnell Douglas.”). 
 109. Stone v. Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing 
the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to retaliation claims). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 643. 
 112. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 8, at 3 (1998) (stating the “essential” elements of a 
retaliation claim). The third element of the prima facie case in retaliation claims can be 
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“causal connection” or “causal link” element to the prima facie case.113   
 
established in different ways.  Initially, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had knowledge 
of the protected activity. See, e.g., Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that without a showing of the supervisor’s knowledge of the protected activity, no causal 
connection exists). The Sixth Circuit actually includes the defendant’s knowledge as a fourth 
element of the prima facie case, but the other circuits find the defendant’s knowledge to be 
inherent in the “causal link” element.  Bukta v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 2d 649, 671 
(N.D. Ohio 2004).  To show that the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity, 
some courts focus on the temporal proximity of the timing of the adverse employment action and 
the plaintiff’s protected activity.  Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 555 
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that five months was not too long a time period to support an inference of 
causation).  Other courts find that timing, by itself, is not sufficient to prove that the plaintiff’s 
protected activity was the reason for the defendant’s adverse action.  See, e.g., Hughes v. 
Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[Timing], standing by itself, does not 
sufficiently raise the inference that Hughes’s filing was the reason for the adverse action.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Zhuang v. Datacard Corp., 414 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[Plaintiff] must 
show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (3) there is a causal connection between her protected conduct and the adverse 
employment action.”); Duncan v. Manager, Dep’t of Safety, 397 F.3d 1300, 1314 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“[Plaintiff] must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse action.”); Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff] must 
show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, 
and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action.”); Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff] must 
show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.”); Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 
383 F.3d 309, 319 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[Plaintiff] must show that: (1) he engaged in an activity 
protected by Title VII; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal 
link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”); Weston v. 
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff] must show that: (1) he or she 
engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action 
after or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the 
protected activity and the adverse action.”); Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(“[Plaintiff] must show that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of 
protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment 
action; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.”); Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“[Plaintiff] must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) her employer 
took an adverse personnel action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the 
two.”); Hernández-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“[Plaintiff] must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in protected conduct under Title VII; (2) he 
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action is causally connected to the 
protected activity.”); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“[Plaintiff] must show (1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) an 
employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th 
Cir. 1998) (“[Plaintiff must prove] that (1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, such as filing 
an EEO complaint; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against plaintiff; and (3) a 
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Adopting the minority view, the Seventh Circuit has argued that requiring 
the plaintiff to establish a causal link is “not really the McDonnell Douglas 
standard” because it would remove the essence of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, which is to “give the plaintiff a boost when he has no actual 
evidence of discrimination (or retaliation) but just some suspicious 
circumstances.”114  If the plaintiff has to establish direct evidence of a causal 
link, then he or she has gone beyond McDonnell Douglas and does not actually 
need McDonnell Douglas to establish a claim for retaliation.115 
The Seventh Circuit’s criticism that the “causal link” element of the prima 
facie case creates an untrue McDonnell Douglas framework may depend on the 
meaning of “causal link.”  If “causal link” means that “the plaintiff must 
present evidence that had it not been for his protected expression he would not 
have been fired,” then the framework is not in accordance with the principles 
of McDonnell Douglas, because direct evidence is required.116  However, if 
“causal link” means, as defined in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, that the 
protected expression and adverse action “were not wholly unrelated,”117 such 
that something less than direct evidence of but-for causation could be sufficient 
to establish the prima facie case,118 the framework would be closer to a true 
McDonnell Douglas framework, because direct evidence may not be 
required.119 
Despite the Seventh Circuit’s criticism, the other circuits have continued to 
hold that the prima facie case for retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework requires proof of a causal link between the plaintiff’s protected 
activity and the employer’s adverse action.120  In response, the Seventh Circuit 
 
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.”); but see Stone 
v. Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2002).  The Seventh Circuit 
reformulated its framework for retaliation cases based on indirect evidence by requiring a 
“similarly situated” analysis, which requires the plaintiff to show that after engaging in protected 
conduct, “only he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not [file a charge or other 
protected conduct], was subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was 
performing his job in a satisfactory manner.”  Stone, 281 F.3d at 642–43. 
 114. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 475–76 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 476. 
 116. Stone, 281 F.3d at 643.  This is the definition applied by every circuit except for the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 2001) (defining 
“causal link”); Pennington v. Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (providing a 
definition of “causal link”). 
 119. Stone, 281 F.3d at 643. 
 120. See, e.g., Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show “that a causal connection 
exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”); Jones v. Washington 
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 205 F.3d 428, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating that to establish a prima 
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has articulated both “direct” and “indirect” methods to establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation.121  The “indirect” method creates a framework as true as 
possible to McDonnell Douglas by requiring “the plaintiff to show that after 
filing the charge [or otherwise opposing the employer’s allegedly 
discriminatory practice] only he, and not any similarly situation employee who 
did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action even 
though he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner.”122  Thus, the 
plaintiff does not need direct evidence to prove retaliation.  Instead, the 
plaintiff must only prove he or she was (1) performing the job satisfactorily, 
(2) subjected to adverse employment action, and (3) similarly situated 
employees were not subjected to adverse employment action.123 
The “direct” method applies essentially the same framework as the other 
circuits for plaintiffs to establish retaliation claims.  The Seventh Circuit calls 
this test “direct” because it requires the plaintiff “to present direct evidence . . . 
that he engaged in protected activity . . . and as a result suffered the adverse 
employment action.”124  Although, the “indirect” method would be preferred 
by plaintiffs because of the difficulty in establishing direct evidence of 
retaliation, the “direct” method is intended for use by the plaintiff when he or 
she cannot prove that a “similarly situated employee who did not oppose the 
employer’s practice was not fired or otherwise treated as badly as the plaintiff 
was.”125 
II.  MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
Most states also implement the untrue version of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework to retaliatory discharge claims, requiring the plaintiff to establish a 
“causal link.”126  Consequently, there would not be any choice of law issues 
 
facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “there [must exist] a causal 
link between the adverse action and the protected activity”). 
 121. Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Stone, 281 F.3d at 644). 
 122. Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902. 
 123. Id; see also Metzger v. Illinois State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing 
the Seventh Circuit’s indirect framework). 
 124. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644 (explaining the Seventh Circuit’s “direct” method of establishing 
a retaliation claim); see Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s “direct” 
method). The direct framework requires a plaintiff to “show through either direct or 
circumstantial evidence that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered 
from adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) there was a casual connection between the 
two.” Metzger, 519 F.3d at 681. 
 125. Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902. 
 126. See, e.g., Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 433 (Alaska 2004) (plaintiff 
must show: “(1) that [the employee] was engaged in a protected activity; (2) that an adverse 
employment decision was made; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the two”); 
Gallanis-Politis v. Medina, 152 Cal. App. 4th 600, 618–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (prima facie case 
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when a state law retaliation claim was brought in federal court because the 
state and federal frameworks would be the same.  Even Judge Richard Posner 
 
of retaliation requires a showing that (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity, (2) 
defendant subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed 
between the protected activity and the employer’s action); Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp., 887 So.2d 
372, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a statutorily protected 
expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the 
participation in the protected expression and the adverse action.”); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem. 
Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 281–82 (Iowa 2000) (employee must establish: (1) engagement in a 
protected activity; (2) discharge; and (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the 
discharge); Bishop v. Manpower, Inc., 211 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]t is incumbent 
on the employee to show at a minimum that he was engaged in a statutorily protected activity, 
that he was discharged, and that there was a connection between the protected activity and the 
discharge.”); Brooks v. S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 877 So.2d 1194, 1221 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (plaintiff employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) she engaged 
in [a protected activity]; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal link existed 
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”); Guercio v. Prod. 
Automation Corp., 664 N.W.2d 379, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (employee must show: “(1) 
statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse employment action by the employer; 
and (3) a causal connection between the two”); Riesen v. Irwin Indus. Tool Co., 717 N.W.2d 907, 
915 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]n employee must show that he or she participated in a protected 
activity, that the employer took an adverse employment action against him or her, and that a 
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”); 
Simeone v. Suffolk, 36 A.D.3d 890, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“[A] plaintiff must show that (1) 
he or she has engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer was aware that he or she participated 
in such activity, (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment action based upon the activity, and 
(4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.”); Jacob v. 
Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 693 N.W.2d 604, 609 (N.D. 2005) (plaintiff must show he or she engaged 
in protected activity and that activity was causally related to his or her termination); Peterson v. 
Buckeye Steel Casings, 729 N.E.2d 813, 821–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (relying on federal case 
law and holding that a plaintiff must establish three elements: “(1) that she engaged in protected 
activity, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal link 
exists between a protected activity and the adverse action”); Uber v. Slippery Rock Univ., 887 
A.2d 362, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (complainant must show that: “(1) he was engaged in a 
protected activity; (2) his employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequent to 
participation in the protected activity, he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) 
there is a causal connection between his participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action”); Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 427 (R.I. 2007) (“To prove a 
claim of retaliation [in Rhode Island], an employee must establish that: (1) [the employee] 
engaged in protected conduct; (2) [the employee] experienced an adverse employment action; and 
(3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment 
action.”); Stewart v. Sanmina Tex. L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 209 (Tex. App. 2005) (“[P]laintiff must 
show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and 
(3) there was a causal connection between participation in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment decision.”); Donahue v. Cent. Wash. Univ., 163 P.3d 801, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2007) (“[P]laintiff must show that (1) he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an 
adverse employment action was taken, and (3) there is a causal link between the employee's 
activity and the employer's adverse action.”). 
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of the Seventh Circuit has recognized that, when the state and federal 
frameworks do not conflict, “the McDonnell Douglas standard . . . [would] 
properly apply to state retaliation cases litigated in federal courts.”127  Further, 
other states have expressly rejected creating a state law claim for retaliation.128  
Conflict of law issues would obviously not arise in these states because the 
federal claim of retaliation would be the only option for employees to use. 
Throughout the entire country, only three courts have recognized that the 
federal framework differs from the state court’s framework, raising potential 
conflict of law issues.  These potential conflicts could, nevertheless, be mere 
red herrings that cause courts and academic authors to debate the merits of 
applying the Erie doctrine to the McDonnell Douglas framework.  In 
jurisdictions with a potential conflict, a comparison between the state and 
federal framework needs to be conducted to decide whether one or more of 
these conflicts are legitimate and need to be resolved, or whether the issue is, 
instead, “much ado about nothing.” 
A. Potential Conflict Between Oregon and the Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Oregon state framework is 
different than the framework applied by the Ninth Circuit.  Although state 
courts in Oregon have never expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s adapted 
McDonnell Douglas framework, in Snead v. Metropolitan Property & 
Casualty Insurance Co.,129 the Ninth Circuit noted that the second and third 
steps of Oregon’s burden-shifting framework are not considered by the court 
until after the summary judgment stage.130  Thus, even if the defendant 
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment 
action against the plaintiff during the summary judgment proceedings, the 
plaintiff would not be required to rebut this evidence to survive the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.131 
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the differences between its 
framework and the Oregon framework were not substantive requirements of 
what evidence needed to be established by the parties.132  Rather, the 
differences merely facilitated a procedural rule to establish the timing of the 
 
 127. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 128. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 372 (Wis. 2002) 
(rejecting a state law claim for retaliatory discharge). 
 129. 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 130. Id. at 1090.  If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the second stage of the Ninth 
Circuit’s adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires the defendant to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for the employment action.  Id. at 1093.  If the defendant 
can articulate the nondiscriminatory motive, the third stage of the framework requires that the 
plaintiff show that the alleged nondiscriminatory motive is pretextual.  Id. 
 131. Id. at 1093. 
 132. Id. at 1091. 
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order in which evidence was presented.133  Consequently, the court found that 
the order of the presentation of evidence would not affect the substantive result 
of the litigation because both frameworks would eventually allow the same 
evidence to be presented.134  Based on this finding, the court concluded that 
“[t]he identical outcomes produced through the state and federal systems make 
it improbable that increased forum-shopping will occur.”135  As a result, 
although the Ninth Circuit completed an entire Erie analysis, its conclusion 
was that the Oregon and Ninth Circuit frameworks are essentially the same, 
causing no choice of law issues.136 
B. Potential Conflict Between Virginia and the Fourth Circuit 
Another state with a potential conflict of law is Virginia, where the state 
supreme court rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework.137  In Jordan v. 
Clay’s Rest Home, Inc.,138 the court rejected the McDonnell Douglas 
framework in the retaliation context because it does not follow the Virginia 
courts’ “strong commitment” to the at-will employment doctrine.139  In 
addition, the court believed that its “procedural and evidentiary framework” for 
establishing a prima facie case was “entirely appropriate” for retaliatory 
discharge cases.140  In light of the court’s commitment to the at-will doctrine, it 
held that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation in Virginia, 
 
 133. Id. (arguing that the only difference between McDonnell Douglas and the Oregon state 
framework is timing).  Under the Ninth Circuit’s framework, the defendant’s evidence and 
plaintiff’s rebuttal were presented prior to the summary judgment stage, while under the state 
framework, these were presented after the summary judgment stage, allowing the plaintiff to 
survive summary judgment by establishing a prima facie case.  Id. 
 134. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1091.  The court assumes that the order of the evidence would not 
impact the substantive result of the trial because if the plaintiff would not survive summary 
judgment on the second or third components of McDonnell Douglas, then this lack of evidence 
would only delay the plaintiff’s loss by bringing the action in state court where a nonsuit or 
directed verdict would be in order.  Id.  However, a counter argument could be made that a 
change in the evidence required at the summary judgment stage could affect the outcome of a trial 
because, in that fact pattern, a directed verdict may not be proper, even if the plaintiff presented 
no evidence of pretext, because the jury could choose not to believe the defendant’s 
nondiscriminatory motive, and the plaintiff’s prima facie case, and the inference of discrimination 
that is created, would not be rebutted.  Sperino, supra note 19, at 391 (arguing that the Snead 
court’s ruling that the differences in timing were not outcome determinative was incorrect). 
 135. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1091.   
 136. Id. 
 137. Jordan v. Clay’s Rest Home, Inc., 483 S.E.2d 203, 207 (Va. 1997) (declining to adopt 
the McDonnell Douglas framework in order to retain the state’s strong commitment to the 
employment-at-will doctrine). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. (noting that the Supreme Court has failed to even mention the at-will employment 
doctrine, even in passing, in any of its references to the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 140. Id. 
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he or she must prove, by circumstantial or direct evidence, that the employee’s 
protected activity caused the employer to discharge the employee.141 
The Fourth Circuit’s requirement of a “causal link” and Virginia’s 
allowance for plaintiffs to establish retaliation by circumstantial evidence 
seems to directly conflict because circumstantial evidence would seem to be 
analogous to indirect evidence.142  However, most courts allow for evidence of 
a “causal link” to be established using circumstantial evidence.143 
Therefore, the only real difference between the Virginia state framework 
and the Fourth Circuit’s framework comes after the prima facie case.  The 
Fourth Circuit’s framework requires, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas, 
the burden to shift to the defendant after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, and then, if the defendant can introduce evidence of a nonretaliatory 
motive, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show the defendant’s alleged 
motive was pretextual.144  The Virginia framework expressly rejects this 
burden-shifting and allows for only the prima facie case to come before the 
summary judgment stage.145  This is the same issue discussed in Snead.146  
Therefore, since, as in Oregon, the substantive result of the case would be the 
same in either court, the Virginia and Fourth Circuit frameworks are 
essentially the same, causing no choice of law issues.147  This is reiterated by 
the fact that although the Supreme Court of Virginia expressly rejected the 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Compare Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Carter v. Ball, 33 
F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994)) (noting in the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff must prove “that (1) 
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, such as filing an EEO complaint; (2) the employer took 
adverse employment action against plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection existed between the 
protected activity and the adverse action”), with Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207 (stating that the 
Virginia framework allows circumstantial evidence to establish retaliation). 
 143. See, e.g., Metzger v. Ill. State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Dorsey v. 
Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007)); Pope v. ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 
1010 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Cokley v. City of Ostego, 623 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001)); Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Morris v. Lindau, 196 
F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999)); DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Brown 
v. ASD Computing Ctr., 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1116 (S.D. Ohio 1981));  Poole v. County of Otero, 
271 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 
(9th Cir. 1989)); Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1294–1303 (11th Cir. 1999).  
Although the above stated courts have found that circumstantial evidence can be used to establish 
the “causal link,” the Fourth Circuit has yet to rule on this issue. 
 144. See, e.g., Causey, 162 F.3d at 800. 
 145. Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207 (stating that “Virginia law is settled . . . in trial of civil actions 
. . . [and] there is no necessity for the Commonwealth to provide a special framework for the trial 
of wrongful discharge cases”). 
 146. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) (arguing 
that the only difference between McDonnell Douglas and the Oregon state framework is timing). 
 147. Id. 
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McDonnell Douglas framework over a decade ago,148 the issue has not been 
addressed or even recognized by the Fourth Circuit.  This supports the notion 
that courts and academic authors have found the potential conflict of law too 
unimportant or non-critical for comment.149 
C. Potential Conflict Between Illinois and the Seventh Circuit 
While the Oregon/Ninth Circuit and Virginia/Fourth Circuit conflicts are 
merely facial and not enough to warrant a full Erie doctrine analysis, Illinois’s 
potential conflict is more complex.  In Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co.,150 
the Supreme Court of Illinois expressly rejected applying the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to state law retaliation claims because the court did not 
feel that “there is anything unique about the tort of retaliatory discharge that 
requires a deviation from the traditional tort law approach to the allocation of 
proof.”151  The court was concerned that the use of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework would expand the tort of retaliatory discharge by reducing the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof for the prima facie case.152 
Illinois state courts instead find that a prima facie claim for retaliatory 
discharge requires a showing that (1) an employee has been discharged, (2) the 
discharge was in retaliation for the employee’s activities, and (3) the discharge 
violated a “clear mandate of public policy.”153  Essentially, direct evidence of 
causation is required to establish the second element of the test.154  If the 
 
 148. Jordan, 483 S.E.2d at 207. 
 149. See Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring) 
(noting that when “there [is] no conflict between state and federal law . . . the ‘McDonnell 
Douglas’ standard . . . [would] properly apply to state retaliation cases litigated in federal 
courts”). 
 150. 704 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. 1998). 
 151. Id. at 408 (“Cases brought for retaliatory discharge based on an employee’s filing of a 
workers’ compensation claim should be reviewed using traditional tort analysis.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 728 (Ill. 1992) (citing Hinthorn v. Roland’s 
of Bloomington, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 909 (Ill. 1988)).  In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 
357 (Ill. 1978), the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a discharge in retaliation for an 
employee’s exercise of workers’ compensation rights violated public policy.  In a workers’ 
compensation context, a valid claim requires that “(1) [the plaintiff] was the defendant’s 
employee before his injury; (2) [the plaintiff] exercised a right granted by the Workers’ 
Compensation Act; (3) and [the plaintiff] was discharged from his employment with a causal 
connection to his filing a workers’ compensation claim.”  Kritzen v. Flender Corp., 589 N.E.2d 
909, 915 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Marin v. Am. Meat Packing Co., 562 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ill. 
1990)). 
 154. E.g., Kelly v. Spartan Light Metal Prods., Inc., No. 03-L-38, 2004 WL 3153219, at *5 
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 24, 2004) (“In order to establish a causal connection between his exercise of 
rights . . . and his discharge, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to either provide direct evidence of 
retaliation or to demonstrate that similarly situated employees who have not exercised rights . . . 
were treated differently under similar circumstances.”). 
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employee is able to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer 
then has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee’s discharge.155  “The element of causation is not met if the 
employer has a valid basis, which is not pretextual, for discharging the 
employee.”156  If the employer meets its burden, “then the plaintiff has an 
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
reasons offered by the defendant were not true, but a pretext for 
discrimination.”157 
“Only if the prima facie case of retaliation under federal law requires proof 
of a causal relation in the usual sense, without attenuation, is there no conflict 
between state and federal law, at least in Illinois . . . .”158  Since the Illinois 
framework requires direct evidence of causation, it differs from the Seventh 
Circuit’s framework, which, as the Seventh Circuit has gone to great lengths to 
articulate,159 does not require any direct evidence of causation as long as the 
plaintiff can show that similarly situated employees were not subjected to 
adverse employment action.160  Thus, unlike the potential conflicts in Oregon 
and Virginia that ended up not being actual conflicts, the issue in Illinois 
appears to be legitimate.  Resolution of the conflict is important because failure 
to determine which test applies could encourage the plaintiff to bring his or her 
retaliation claim in federal court since the Seventh Circuit test is more 
plaintiff-friendly, not requiring direct evidence of causation.161 
The Seventh Circuit in Illinois has recognized this issue on several 
occasions.  When the issue was first brought before the court in McEwen v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,162 the court noted that the unresolved issue was a “nice 
question,” but then went on to suggest that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
was procedural and thus only applicable in federal courts in diversity.163  Four 
years later, in Hiatt v. Rockwell International Corp.,164 the court reiterated its 
 
 155. Gomez v. The Finishing Co., Inc., 861 N.E.2d 189, 197–98 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting 
All Purpose Nursing Serv. v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 563 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. 1990)). 
 156. Hartlein, 601 N.E.2d at 728. 
 157. Gomez, 861 N.E.2d at 198. 
 158. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 477 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 159. See Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(reiterating the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for not requiring direct evidence of causation); Stone 
v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642–43 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining why the 
Seventh Circuit’s framework does not require direct evidence of causation). 
 160. Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 902. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 919 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 163. Id. at 59–60 (“Although [the McDonnell Douglas framework] identifies circumstances 
under which particular items become important, it is in the end no more substantive than is the 
order in which parties present their evidence at trial; all of the substance comes from Title VII (or, 
here, the common law of Illinois).”). 
 164. 26 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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decision in McEwen, that McDonnell Douglas was procedural, noting that 
“federal courts may still employ [their] own procedural rules, including the 
sequential inquiry analysis employed in Title VII cases, when hearing cases 
based on Illinois law.”165 
When the issue made it back to the Seventh Circuit six years later, the 
court again recognized that the issue was unresolved.166  In Bourbon v. Kmart 
Corp., Judge Posner’s concurrence suggested that “[s]omeday we’ll have to 
decide what the prima facie case of retaliation is in the Seventh Circuit.”167  
However, without fully resolving the issue, Judge Posner seemed to suggest 
that, if he had to decide, he would find that the framework is substantive and, 
therefore, would apply the state framework.168 
The Seventh Circuit again recognized the importance of the unresolved 
issue four years later in Carter v. Tennant Co.,169 but it again failed to resolve 
the issue because the parties waived the issue by ignoring it on appeal (and 
because the issue was moot since the plaintiff’s claim failed under both the 
state and McDonnell Douglas frameworks).170 
The Seventh Circuit most recently recognized the unresolved issue in 
McCoy v. Maytag Corp.,171 when it stated that “[s]ome question remains, 
however, regarding whether, under the Erie doctrine, a federal court exercising 
diversity jurisdiction to hear a retaliatory discharge claim . . . must apply the 
Illinois framework, or . . . the [McDonnell Douglas framework].”172  In 
 
 165. Id. at 767 n.4. 
 166. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 476 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 476–77 (“If the requirement of proving cause is so attenuated as to give the 
plaintiff a boost toward winning his case that he would not have under ordinary rules of pleading 
and production, then there is a conflict with substantive state law, and what the federal courts 
inaptly call the McDonnell Douglas standard for proving retaliation must give way in any 
retaliation case governed by state law.”). 
 169. 383 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 170. Id. at 678. 
 171. 495 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 172. Id. at 521 (citation omitted).  Illinois federal district courts have also recognized that the 
Seventh Circuit has failed to resolve the conflict between the Illinois and McDonnell Douglas 
frameworks.  See Andreu v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 07 C 6132, 2008 WL 1774990, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. April 17, 2008) (“The Seventh Circuit recently noted that there is some ambiguity on 
the issue of whether federal courts, sitting in diversity, should apply the Illinois tort standard for 
addressing retaliatory discharge claims, or whether federal courts should apply the burden-
shifting method from McDonnell Douglas.”) (citation omitted); Crawford v. Am. Coal Co., No. 
07-CV-0115-MJR, 2008 WL 686975, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2008) (“The Seventh Circuit has 
not squarely decided whether, under the Erie doctrine, a federal court exercising jurisdiction to 
hear a retaliatory discharge claim under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act must apply the 
Illinois framework, or whether it may use the familiar burden-shifting method of McDonnell 
Douglas.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Thompson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
No. 06 C 1235, 2007 WL 4287513, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2007) (“The Seventh Circuit has not 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] THE ERIE DOCTRINE & McDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK 951 
McCoy, the plaintiff was an assembly line worker in the defendant’s washer 
and dryer manufacturing facility.173  The plaintiff injured his left shoulder 
while moving washing machine bases.174  After the injury, the plaintiff 
reported the incident to his supervisor and was examined by a physician’s 
assistant, who decided that the plaintiff was fit to return to light-duty work the 
next day with restrictions on his lifting.175  The plaintiff provided this 
assessment to the defendant’s on-site nurse and workers’ compensation 
specialist.176 
The plaintiff returned to work the next day until another physician 
modified his work restrictions to restrict the plaintiff from using his left arm.177  
Since the defendant had no jobs to accommodate the plaintiff’s restriction, the 
plaintiff’s supervisor told the plaintiff to go home.178  In the following months, 
the plaintiff filled out the required compensation forms and stayed in touch 
with the defendant’s workers’ compensation specialist, providing his medical 
evaluation forms, which were completed by his treating physicians.179 
However, for thirty days after surgery on his shoulder, the plaintiff failed 
to report medical updates to the defendant.180  Since the plaintiff did not 
provide a medical update justifying his nonattendance at work after his leave 
 
yet settled the issue of whether a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction should apply the 
Illinois state law framework to hear a retaliatory discharge claim or use the familiar burden-
shifting method first presented in McDonnell Douglas.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Killis v. Medieval Knights, LLC, No. 04 C 6297, 2007 WL 4302470, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 
2007) (“An outstanding question remains concerning whether a federal court exercising diversity 
jurisdiction over a retaliatory discharge claim should use the above-cited Illinois framework, or 
whether it may use the familiar burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.”) (citation omitted); Casanova v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 06 C 4762, 2007 WL 4108918, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2007) (“It is not clear, however, whether . . . a federal court exercising 
diversity jurisdiction to hear a retaliation discharge claim under the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Act must apply the Illinois framework, or whether it may use the [McDonnell 
Douglas] burden-shifting method.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Manis v. Herrin Laundry 
Prods., No. 05-CV-4150-JPG, 2007 WL 2410101, *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2007) (“There is some 
dispute about the methods a plaintiff may use to withstand summary judgment on a retaliatory 
discharge claim which finds itself in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  Some 
courts believe that a plaintiff may use [the McDonnell Douglas framework] because it is a purely 
procedural mechanism.  Others believe that a method of resisting summary judgment may amount 
to a substantive issue that under Erie v. Tompkins, is governed by state law, which soundly rejects 
the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in retaliatory discharge cases and 
requires a direct method of proof.”) (citations omitted). 
 173. McCoy, 495 F.3d at 517. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. McCoy, 495 F.3d at 517–18. 
 179. Id. at 518. 
 180. See id. at 519–20. 
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of absence expired, the defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment for 
failing to comply with the notice provision of its collective bargaining 
agreement.181  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging that he 
was terminated in retaliation for his exercise of his workers’ compensation 
rights.182 
The Court identified that it needed “to determine . . . whether the 
McDonnell Douglas framework is substantive or procedural when it is applied 
in [the context of a retaliatory discharge claim].”183  “If the McDonnell 
Douglas framework is substantive for Erie purposes, then [the court] must 
apply the Illinois framework when a retaliatory discharge claim under the 
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act” is brought into federal court by diversity 
jurisdiction.184  Despite the court’s recognition of a need to resolve this issue, 
the court again elected to leave the issue “for another day,” because under 
either framework the plaintiff would have lost the case as the employer 
provided a valid, non-pretextual reason for terminating the plaintiff’s 
employment.185  The plaintiff would have lost under the Illinois framework 
because if the employer comes forward with a valid, non-pretextual basis for 
the discharge, the causation requirement of the prima facie case is not met.186  
The plaintiff would have also lost under the Seventh Circuit’s indirect 
framework because the employer met its burden by providing a valid, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination, and the plaintiff failed 
to show that the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual.187 
The ironic aspect about the conflict of law in Illinois is that the Illinois 
framework’s requirement of direct evidence of causation would coincide with 
any circuit except the Seventh Circuit.  The fact that the Seventh Circuit’s 
framework differs from all other circuits raises the issue of whether the state 
frameworks of the other two states located within the Seventh Circuit, Indiana 
and Wisconsin, also create conflicts of law.  However, the Seventh Circuit’s 
retaliation framework does not create a conflict of law issue in Indiana because 
Indiana is one of a minority of states that allows indirect evidence to “impl[y] 
the necessary inference of causation.”188  In addition, no conflict of law issues 
 
 181. Id. at 519. 
 182. Id. at 520. 
 183. McCoy, 495 F.3d at 521. 
 184. Id. at 521–22. 
 185. Id. at 522. 
 186. Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. 1998). 
 187. McCoy, 495 F.3d at 522 (“Even assuming that McCoy could demonstrate a prima facie 
case of retaliatory discharge under either the Illinois framework or the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, McCoy’s claim fails because Maytag has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for terminating McCoy’s employment.”). 
 188. M.C. Welding & Machining Co., Inc. v. Kotwa, 845 N.E.2d 188, 192–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006) (“To succeed on a claim of retaliatory discharge, ‘[t]he employee must present evidence 
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result in Wisconsin from retaliation frameworks because Wisconsin does not 
recognize state law claims for retaliation.189 
Illinois remains the only state with a retaliation framework conflict of law 
because of the Seventh Circuit’s unwillingness to resolve the issue of whether 
its application of the McDonnell Douglas framework is procedural or 
substantive.  Although discussion about this issue in the other forty-nine states 
is much ado about nothing, the conflict between Illinois and the Seventh 
Circuit needs to be resolved.  Resolution of the issue could also be important in 
the event that other states or circuits adopt new frameworks, creating a conflict 
of law. 
III.  RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW ISSUE IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
As explained in Section II above, the retaliation framework in Illinois 
conflicts with the framework applied by the Seventh Circuit.  Thus, there is a 
conflict as to whether Illinois state law retaliation claims that arrive in the 
Seventh Circuit based on diversity, such as McCoy v. Maytag Corp., should 
apply the Illinois or Seventh Circuit framework. 
Of course, the easiest resolution of this conflict would be for the Seventh 
Circuit to join the other circuits in adopting a framework that requires a “causal 
link” between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse 
employment action.190  A change by the Seventh Circuit would cause both the 
Illinois and Seventh Circuit frameworks to require direct evidence, thereby 
eliminating the conflict of law issue.  However, the Seventh Circuit has made it 
abundantly clear that it is not going to budge and will not be joining the other 
circuits.191 
 
that directly or indirectly implies the necessary inference of causation between the [statutorily 
conferred right] and the termination, such as proximity in time or evidence that the employer’s 
asserted lawful reason for discharge is a pretext.’”) (quoting Dale v. J.G. Bowers, Inc., 709 
N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 189. Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Wis. 2002) (“The public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine . . . has never been extended to terminations 
in retaliation for conduct outside the employment relationship . . . [and] [t]o allow it here would 
therefore expand the exception beyond its present boundaries . . . with no logical limiting 
principles.”). 
 190. Currently, the Seventh Circuit does not require a “causal link.”  Stone v. City of 
Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting the Seventh Circuit 
reformulated its framework for retaliation cases based on indirect evidence by requiring a 
“similarly situated” analysis, which requires the plaintiff to show that after engaging in protected 
conduct, “only he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge [or other 
protected conduct], was subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was 
performing his job in a satisfactory manner.”); see supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text 
(describing the Seventh Circuit’s framework for retaliation claims). 
 191. See Stone, 281 F.3d at 642–43 (providing rationale for the Seventh Circuit’s position that 
the retaliation framework does not require direct evidence of causation); Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 
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Consequently, to resolve this conflict, an Erie doctrine analysis is 
necessary to determine which framework is to be used.  A thorough Erie 
doctrine analysis should close a notable hole in retaliatory discharge law 
caused by the lack of judicial discussion or academic literature on this topic.192 
Since “[f]ederal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the 
adjudication of state-created rights, but it does not carry with it generation of 
rules of substantive law,” application of the Erie doctrine issue should begin 
with the substantive/procedural distinction.193  The Supreme Court, without 
articulating a full Erie doctrine analysis for the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, has noted in dicta on several occasions that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework is procedural.194  First, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. 
Hicks, the Court stated that “the McDonnell Douglas presumption is a 
procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and 
production.”195  Seven years later, the Supreme Court reiterated this statement 
when it stated that “McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have 
‘established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the 
presentation of proof in . . . discriminatory-treatment cases.’”196 
The Supreme Court’s assertions that the McDonnell Douglas framework is 
procedural are also supported when performing an Erie doctrine analysis.  An 
Erie analysis would start with the outcome-determinative test, with 
consideration given to Gasperini’s twin aims of Erie, which include 
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.197  In addition, consideration must be given to 
whether any federal interests of applying the Seventh Circuit framework 
 
223 F.3d 469, 475–76 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that a true McDonnell 
Douglas framework does not require direct evidence of a “causal link”). 
 192. See Bourbon, 223 F.3d at 474 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting a lack of 
“any illuminating scholarly discussions of the issue”); Sperino, supra note 19, at 352–53 (stating 
that the lack of “academic commentary on the intersection of these two principles” is surprising 
considering “the potential federalism problems that improper vertical choice of law 
characterization will bring to employment law”); supra notes 150–84 and accompanying text 
(establishing that the only conflict on law concerning retaliation claim frameworks arises in the 
Seventh Circuit and Illinois). 
 193. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–27 (1996) (finding 
that making the distinction between procedural and substantive is still the main thrust of the Erie 
doctrine analysis). 
 194. Even though the Supreme Court’s statements were not essential to the final decision of 
the case, the statements can be probative of the Court’s view on this issue. 
 195. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993). 
 196. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (alteration in 
original). 
 197. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428. 
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outweigh Illinois’s interests in applying its own framework.198  In the context 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework, although the framework is arguably 
outcome determinative, overriding federal interests are sufficient to classify the 
framework as procedural. 
An argument can be made that the Seventh Circuit and Illinois frameworks 
for retaliation are outcome determinative in light of the twin aims of Erie.  
First, the application of the framework in federal courts potentially encourages 
forum-shopping.  The forum-shopping requirement weighs whether the 
application of state law will encourage a party to choose to file suit in one 
court instead of another because the results would be different.199  Here, the 
plaintiff-friendly Seventh Circuit framework could encourage employees to 
file suit in federal court rather than Illinois state court in order to avoid having 
to present direct evidence of a “causal link” of the employee’s protected 
behavior and the employer’s adverse employment action. 
In addition, the application of the Seventh Circuit’s framework could 
potentially result in an inequitable administration of the laws.  To avoid the 
inequitable administration of the laws, federal courts must apply state law 
when it would be unfair for the result of a litigation to differ merely because 
the claim was brought in federal court.200  An employee without direct 
evidence of causation would lose in Illinois state court but could still meet the 
prima facie case of retaliation in the Seventh Circuit, as long as the plaintiff 
can establish that “only he, and not any similarly situated employee . . . was 
subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was performing his 
job in a satisfactory manner.”201  Thus, the consequence of the differences 
between the Seventh Circuit and Illinois frameworks could be an inequitable 
administration of the laws because the same parties in the same suit could 
reach different results solely because the suit was held in federal court instead 
of Illinois state court. 
However, although the McDonnell Douglas framework may be outcome 
determinative, the Seventh Circuit’s framework is supported by “overriding 
federal interests.”202  The federal court system is “an independent system 
for . . . litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction.”203  In the eyes of the 
Supreme Court, an “essential characteristic” of the federal court system is the 
manner in which it distributes trial functions between judge and jury.204  The 
 
 198. Id. at 431–32.  If federal interests outweigh state interests, then the court should apply 
the McDonnell Douglas framework or try to accommodate both interests.  See id. 
 199. Hannah v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965). 
 200. Id. at 467. 
 201. Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 202. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 203. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). 
 204. Id. 
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Supreme Court places a high value on its allocation of functions between judge 
and jury in a trial and, as a result, federal courts “cannot in every case exact 
compliance with a state rule . . . which disrupts the federal system of allocating 
functions between judge and jury.”205 
In the context of the conflict of law between the Seventh Circuit and 
Illinois, application of the Illinois framework would prevent more plaintiffs 
from being able to establish a prima facie case because direct evidence of 
retaliation can be hard to establish.206  Thus, more cases would be dismissed 
prior to reaching the jury under the Illinois framework than under the Seventh 
Circuit’s framework.  Preventing cases from getting to the jury in state law 
retaliation claims would alter the federal court’s allocation between judge and 
jury because it could affect when a judge is forced to take the case out of the 
discretion of the jury.  As a result, the federal courts have an “overriding 
federal interest” to apply the Seventh Circuit framework in federal court to 
Illinois state law retaliation claims in order to maintain the federal allocation of 
functions between judge and jury.207 
Further, although a counter argument can be made that federal courts have 
“no interest in determining what facts [are] material to summary judgment on a 
state law discrimination claim,”208 when summary judgment is being argued in 
and ruled on by federal courts, using federal judges and juries, federal courts 
do have an interest in the use of their judges and juries.209  The application of 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas framework in 
federal courts to Illinois state law retaliation claims protects the federal interest 
in the allocation of functions between judge and jury.210  Thus, although 
application of the Seventh Circuit’s framework could be outcome 
determinative, the federal court’s interest in the allocation between judge and 
jury overrides Illinois’s interest in the application of its own retaliation 
framework, and McDonnell Douglas should be classified as procedural. 
A determination that the McDonnell Douglas framework is procedural 
would benefit the plaintiff in McCoy v. Maytag Corp.  Under the Illinois 
framework, he would have failed to establish a prima facie case since he did 
not have direct evidence that the defendant employer discharged him because 
 
 205. Id. at 537–38; see also Snead, 237 F.3d at 1092 (providing this rationale as a federal 
interest to apply McDonnell Douglas to state retaliation claims in federal court). 
 206. See Stone, 281 F.3d at 643 (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of requiring 
plaintiffs to establish direct evidence of causation). 
 207. See Snead, 237 F.3d at 1092 (making the argument that McDonnell Douglas should be 
applied to state retaliation claims in federal court because it would allow the court to maintain its 
allocation of judge and jury). 
 208. Sperino, supra note 19, at 394. 
 209. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958). 
 210. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1092 (concluding that applying McDonnell Douglas protects the 
overriding federal interest of allocating functions between judge and jury in federal courts). 
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he filed a worker’s compensation claim.211  However, he would be able to 
establish a prima facie case under the Seventh Circuit’s indirect framework 
because he would only have to show his work performance was satisfactory 
and that other “similarly situated” employees did not get terminated.212 
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, the final outcome of McCoy 
would not be impacted.  The Seventh Circuit found that even if the plaintiff 
was able to establish a prima facie case, the defendant employer articulated a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff because the 
plaintiff breached the collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide the 
employer with status reports regarding his medical condition every thirty days 
and by failing to notify the employer within forty-eight hours regarding his 
failure to return after his leave of absence expired.213  The plaintiff lost the case 
because although he argued that the employer deliberately misread the 
collective bargaining agreement, this argument failed to establish that the 
employer’s nondiscriminatory reason was mere pretext for its “larger plot to 
drive down workers’ compensation costs by targeting workers’ compensation 
filers.”214 
Although the outcome of McCoy would not be altered, this illustration 
indicates the impact that the determination of the Seventh Circuit framework as 
procedural can have on future cases.  Permitting all plaintiffs in federal court to 
use the Seventh Circuit’s indirect method will allow more plaintiffs to establish 
a prima facie case and, thus, allow more cases to reach the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Conflict of law between federal and state frameworks for retaliation claims 
is much ado about nothing in forty-nine of the fifty states.  Most federal and 
state courts apply the untrue McDonnell Douglas framework, requiring direct 
evidence of causation, to retaliation claims.215  As a result, conflict of law in 
these states is not an issue.  Further, additional states, such as Wisconsin, have 
refused to acknowledge a state law claim for retaliation, and conflict of law in 
these states would also not be an issue. 216  Conflict of law, moreover, would 
not be an issue in states like Oregon and Virginia, which rejected the 
McDonnell Douglas framework’s burden-shifting because it would cause only 
 
 211. McCoy v. Maytag Corp., 495 F.3d 515, 517–19 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 522. 
 214. Id. at 523–24. 
 215. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text (explaining that most circuit courts 
apply the untrue McDonnell Douglas standard for retaliation claims); supra notes 125–27 and 
accompanying text (explaining that most state courts apply the untrue McDonnell Douglas 
standard for retaliation claims). 
 216. See, e.g., Bammert v. Don’s Super Valu, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Wis. 2002) 
(refusing to recognize a state law claim for retaliation). 
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a difference in the timing of evidence presented, still allowing for “identical 
outcomes” regardless of the framework.217 
The limited scope of conflict of law issues for retaliation frameworks is 
notable because it helps to explain court and academic questions as to why 
more emphasis has not been given to this issue.  Since the issue is only alive in 
Illinois, it would only be relevant to discuss the issue in that context, and 
asking for broader scope to be given to the issue would be based merely on 
hypothetical questions that would be irrelevant unless any federal circuit or 
state decides to change its retaliation framework. 
The problem with narrowing the scope of discussion to the Seventh Circuit 
is that it presents the minority view by allowing retaliation plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case without requiring direct evidence of causation.218  
Since Illinois’s framework would be in accordance with the other eleven 
circuits, the conflict of law issue in Illinois would be foreclosed if the Seventh 
Circuit decided to join the majority view.  If that were to occur, the entire issue 
of McDonnell Douglas and conflict of law would truly be much ado about 
nothing. 
However, since the Seventh Circuit is not likely to change its view,219 
deeming the Seventh Circuit’s adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework as procedural or substantive will impact the future of state law 
retaliation claims in Illinois.  An Erie analysis conclusion in accordance with 
the conclusion of this Comment, that the McDonnell Douglas framework is 
procedural because of overriding federal interests in the federal courts’ 
allocation of judge and jury, will allow employees, such as the plaintiff in 
McCoy¸ to establish state law retaliation claims without using direct evidence 
if the case is brought in federal court.220  However, if the Seventh Circuit were 
to find, alternatively, that the McDonnell Douglas framework is substantive 
because of its outcome-determinative nature, plaintiffs bringing state law 
claims of retaliation would be foreclosed from the Seventh Circuit’s indirect 
method, and they would be required to establish a causal link with direct 
evidence.221  As a result, the Seventh Circuit’s final determination on this 
 
 217. See supra notes 128–47 and accompanying text (describing that there is no conflict of 
law if the only difference in the frameworks is related to timing of evidence). 
 218. See supra notes 111–24 and accompanying text (explaining that the Seventh Circuit’s 
framework is the minority view because it does not require direct evidence of causation). 
 219. See supra notes 114–24 and accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit’s policy 
reasons for refusing to join the other circuits and require direct evidence of causation). 
 220. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling 
that the Seventh Circuit does not require direct evidence of causation). 
 221. Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 728 (Ill. 1992). 
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issue, whether or not in accordance with the analysis provided in this 
Comment, will certainly not be much ado about nothing for employers and 
employees in Illinois. 
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